Do organizational processes of legitimation and competition operate within different boundaries corresponding to different geographical levels of analysis ? Following Hannan et al. (1995), this analysis explores the possibility that legitimation operates on a broader geographical scale (less constrained by political and physical barriers) than does competition. We test the argument by examining founding rates of American automobile producers from 1885 to 1981, within the framework of density-dependent modeling. Our findings suggest that within the United States, legitimation operated on a national scale while competition proceeded primarily on a regional level. Comparison with automobile producer populations in Europe yields differences in application and interpretation of the theory. 1997 Academic Press
many organizations. For instance, institutionalists delineate societal sectors before they concern themselves with issues such as the diffusion of normatively ''appropriate'' organizational forms within societal sectors (Scott and Meyer, 1983) . Similarly, resource dependence theorists demarcate networks so that they can analyze opportunities and constraints within interdependent webs of firms (Burt, 1992) . And, likewise, organizational ecologists define organizational population boundaries in order to model competition processes among populations of organizations (Hannan and Carroll, 1992) .
Recent work in organizational ecology proposes a theoretically motivated strategy for dealing with the boundaries of organizational processes. In continued development of the density-dependent model of organizational evolution, researchers have specified that the two main processes hypothesized to operate do so within different social and geographical boundaries. 1 In particular, Hannan and Carroll (1992) and contend that legitimation of an organizational form (the first process) occurs on a broader geographical scale than does competition among organizations characterized by the form (the second process). That is, they argue that ''competitive environments tend to be more local than institutional environments'' (Hannan et al., 1995 p. 6) .
The argument yields important differences in the specification of mathematical models of organizational evolution and their empirical testing. So, in their analysis of the European automobile industry, specify a model that shows legitimation operating on a continent-wide basis, while competition occurs primarily within nation-state boundaries. 2 present evidence supporting this specification for Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, but it does not hold for Britain. Given Britain's geographical location, this pattern of findings suggests that physical geography may play a role in delineating population processes. The thesis of relatively local competition might also work itself out at different geographical levels in correspondence to different sociopolitical boundaries. In theoretical terms, the issue concerns the extent to which legitimation and competition are circumscribed by sociopolitical boundaries (Barnett and Carroll, 1993) or by physical geography (Carroll and Wade, 1991) .
Our efforts here represent an attempt to continue exploring questions of multiple boundaries for processes pertaining to organizational populations. In order to facilitate cumulativity, we do so in a way that closely follows the research of . Specifically, we continue to examine questions of geographic level of applicability for density-dependent processes of legitimation and competition. We also continue to study the automobile industry. However, our analysis does shift locales: we investigate the American automobile industry rather than the European industry. The American industry initially sprang up and grew with much contact from European producers. However, it quickly surpassed the European countries in size and scale (see Carroll and Hannan, 1995 for a capsule review). The United States is also obviously much larger geographically and more distant from the core countries of Europe than Britain. These facts allow us to explore whether legitimation and competition are constrained in this context primarily by nation-state boundaries or by geographical factors. We do so by contrasting performance of the multilevel density model specified for the entire country relative to Europe as opposed to a specification of internal geographical regions relative to the nation-state. The findings show the value of Hannan et al.'s (1995) theoretical argument but suggest additional issues requiring consideration in application.
REGIONAL PATTERNS OF INDUSTRY EMERGENCE IN THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
Although the automobile was first invented and developed in France and Germany in the early 1880s, technical knowledge and societal expectations regarding it quickly spread to the United States. Three regions of the United States soon came to harbor pockets of emerging automotive manufacturing enterprises. The Duryea brothers of Springfield, Massachusetts built the first gasoline automobile (destined for production) in the United States in 1893. Soon after, in 1894, Elwood Haynes and the Apperson brothers completed their prototype gasoline automobile in Indiana. That same year, in Philadelphia, the Morris and Salom electric car was built and soon the firm grew into a large holding company producing electric cars outside New York City (Flink, 1988) . Thus, the three regions of New England, the Midwest (primarily Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan), and the New York metropolitan area represented the centers of initial industry development.
Early automobile technology diffused widely. The proliferation of trade journals and magazines devoted to the ''horseless carriage'' spurred this diffusion. So too did widely publicized endurance races such as the Chicago Times-Herald race in 1895, in which just 2 of 83 entrants were able to complete the 55-mile course (Rae, 1959; Flink, 1970) . Races were held throughout the three regions of initial automotive activity. They soon spread to other parts of the country as automobiles and automobile manufacturing firms appeared in other states.
The early history of the automobile industry in the United States hints at the possibility of varying geographical influences. On the one hand, automotive historians (e.g., Rae, 1959 Rae, , 1984 Flink, 1970) note that technological development did not occur in isolation and ideas about what automobiles should look like and, by extension, the organizations that produced them diffused widely. Such a process would support Hannan et al.'s (1995) contention that legitimation operates at a broad level, and that the diffusion mechanisms which foster legitimation are relatively unconstrained by local factors. On the other hand, historians also note that in the early period of the industry, the three regions of initial automotive development each spawned and developed its own technology.
In particular, the New York metropolitan area cultivated the production of electric cars; the New England region, propulsion by steam technology; and the Midwest, gasoline cars. 3 The fact that alternative automobile technologies coexisted in all five regions highlights the scope of the diffusion process. However, the association of regions with specific technologies suggests that local conditions and local resources may have played an important role in subsequent founding patterns.
The spatially bounded development of alternative automobile technologies is the main reason we explore regional, rather than state-or city-level density in the model. Rae (1959 Rae ( , 1984 and Rubenstein (1992) argue that regionally based differences in proximity to raw materials, natural endowments, terrain, and density of urban centers led to the evolution of the three distinct automobile manufacturing regions identified above. Rubenstein (1992) , for example, describes the existence of a network of six recharging stations between New York and Philadelphia at the turn of the century (at a time when such stations were rare) as evidence of the popularity of electric cars in the Mid-Atlantic region. In another study analyzing locational patterns of automobile producers from 1895 to 1958, Boas (1961) also presents empirical evidence of the early establishment of distinct multistate regions of activity. He finds that four regions emerged by 1900 (roughly consistent with our Midwest, New England, Mid-Atlantic, and West regions described below) and remained centers of production throughout the period of his study. 4 He argues that these regions emerged in conjunction with other manufacturing and urban centers. He also emphasizes that automobile production thrived in areas beyond southern Michigan.
More generally, we note with interest Hounshell's (1984) argument that many manufacturing methods were regionally constrained. He observes that among bicycle manufacturers (an important precursor industry, see Carroll et al., 1996 , for further discussion) differences in production technique were associated with regions. Bicycle manufacturers in the Midwest were more likely to use metal stamping techniques than were bicycle manufacturers located elsewhere. Metal stamping was eventually incorporated in the automobile production process.
In sum, historians and economic geographers alike routinely describe regionally based rather than city-or state-based clusters of activity. 5 So we explore its feasibility as the appropriate level for examining variations in organizational evolution within the United States. operating organizations) as well as foundings for the period 1885-1981. (We describe our data sources below.) Note that with the exception of the South, foundings begin in earnest at roughly the same time, around 1895, across the United States. This is consistent with the historical record and observers such as Rae (1959) and Flink (1970 Flink ( , 1988 who emphasize that the diffusion of automobile technology in the United States was not reliant on a single source of innovation. Rather, technology diffused from discrete pockets of innovators who all presumably had access to the technology which had been developed in Europe 10 years earlier. The rough coincidence of initial founding patterns facilitates regional comparisons. Examining density region-by-region shows some notable differences. Like national density, the Midwest region reached its peak around 1910. New England and the Mid-Atlantic experienced maximum density roughly 10 years earlier. The West and South regions exhibited dual peaks in density, one in the pre-WWI period and another much later. The second (small) peak may be attributable to the concentration of alternative-fuel car producers in California and Florida and to the rise of other specialist producers.
ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION IN MULTILEVEL SYSTEMS
Extensive empirical research demonstrates that diverse organizational populations-labor unions, newspapers, breweries, life insurance companies, savings and loans, among others-exhibit similar long-term patterns of growth, stabilization, and decline over time. Organizational ecology explains these patterns with the theory of density-dependent legitimation and competition (Hannan, 1986; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Hannan and Carroll, 1992) . According to this theory, in the initial phase of a population's development, when density is low, increases in density are associated with legitimation or social ''taken for grantedness.'' That is, legitimation increases as more organizations enter the population initially. Subsequent increases in density yield relatively smaller gains in legitimation such that legitimation increases with density but at a decreasing rate. Rising legitimation increases founding rates and depresses failure rates. At high levels of density, competition processes dominate because competition increases with density at an increasing rate. Competition entails a tightening of the resource base on which extant organizations in a population depend and which potential entrants may consider when making their entry decision. So competition depresses founding rates and increases mortality rates. A third component of the theory-the so-called density delay effect-predicts that density at the time of founding has an enduring competitive effect on mortality. Putting the arguments together implies that both founding and failure rates track contemporaneous density nonmonotonically. The relationship between contemporaneous density and founding rates shows an inverted U shape, and the relationship between contemporaneous density and mortality displays a U shape. Density at the time of founding shows a monotonic positive relationship with mortality.
We focus here on whether different geographic levels of analysis lead to changes in the effects of density on population vital rates. A variety of available studies explore this question empirically (see Carroll and Wade, 1991; Swaminathan and Wiedenmayer, 1991; Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Baum and Singh, 1994; Haveman and Romanelli, 1994; Lomi, 1995; . Results generally support the prediction that local density has a stronger competitive effect, at least on founding rates, than global or nonlocal density. The few studies which estimate both vital rates suggest that foundings may be more sensitive to geographic specification of density than mortality.
In a study of American brewers, Carroll and Wade (1991) find modest evidence that founding models are more sensitive to density than mortality when varying the geographic level of analysis. They report the predicted nonmonotonic regional density effects in eight of nine regional founding models as opposed to seven of nine models which use national density terms. The predicted nonmonotonic density effects are revealed in only four of nine regional mortality models which specify density at the regional level as compared to seven of nine mortality models which use national density terms. In an analysis of mortality rates of Bavarian brewers, Swaminathan and Wiedenmayer (1991) find that both regional and national density terms show the predicted effects. They, too, suggest that the case might be different for foundings. Haveman and Romanelli (1994) and Baum and Singh (1994) also find empirical support for stronger localized competitive effects in populations of savings and loans and day care centers, respectively. Lomi (1995) in a founding analysis of Italian cooperative banks also finds that competitive effects are manifested more strongly through local than nonlocal density.
The theoretical question remains, however, as to why, and under what conditions, different levels of density should have different effects on either vital rate. Most of the above studies develop convincing ad hoc interpretations but they fail to advance a general theoretical argument. address this important issue. They argue, generally, that legitimation processes operate more broadly than competition processes for two primary reasons. First, legitimation of an organizational form relies on a ''cultural'' diffusion process that is less constrained by political boundaries than competition. As explain, even totalitarian regimes find it difficult, if not impossible, to curtail the flow of cultural images from other, more permissive countries. Second, competition revolves primarily around local resources, although the degree to which local resources drive competition may vary according to the characteristics of a given population (i.e., degree of labor or capital intensiveness). Hannan et al.'s (1995) argument implies that the part of the density model associated with legitimation-the first-order term of contemporaneous densityshould be specified at the higher geographical level. The competition components of the model-density at time of founding and the second-order term of contemporaneous density-should remain specified at the lower or local geographical level. Thus, the model may be specified as
where the founding rate of a geographic unit, i (t), depends on density of both a higher-scale geographic unit, N i , and the squared density of the unit itself, n i 2 . It is predicted that ␤ 1 Ͼ 0, ␤ 2 Ͻ 0. 6 In Hannan et al.'s (1995) analysis of European automobile producers, legitimation effects are specified at the continent level while competition effects result from the national level. A straightforward application of this specification to the U.S. population of automobile producers would cast legitimation-related variables at the world, continent or partial two-continent (Europe and the United States) levels and competition at the national level. However, after estimating and evaluating numerous such models, we have found no consistent pattern of effects and have not been able to reach a plausible interpretation. found a similar problem with the automobile industry in Britain (although Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy all yielded the expected pattern).
Both Britain and the United States are geographically separated by water from continental Europe. Perhaps, this separation slows or inhibits the cultural diffusion associated with legitimation. Moreover, the sheer size and geographical scale of the U.S. industry suggest that it might have evolved more independently, perhaps even requiring its own legitimation process. Anecdotal historical evidence (described briefly above) suggests that much competition in the industry was circumscribed by region rather than by the nation-state, at least for the Midwest, New England, and Mid-Atlantic areas. For these reasons, we use here a respecified version of Hannan et al.'s (1995) argument that competition is a more local process than legitimation. In this analysis, we explore models with legitimation effects of density cast at the national level and competition effects at the regional level.
Following the logic of the study, this analysis proceeds in three stages. First, foundings in each region are modeled using only regional density terms (n i and n i 2 ). Thus the model takes the form
Next, foundings in each region are modeled using only total remaining U.S. density terms (N i and N i 2 ). N i is calculated by subtracting focal regional density from total U.S. density. This avoids using overlapping density counts in the models. The model takes the form 7
Finally, two models are run for each region which include both N i and n i terms. These models are designed to test our hypothesis concerning the impact of regional over national density on founding rates. In the first formulation the model is specified as
Then, in an attempt to follow exactly Hannan et al.'s specification, the following model is also tested:
According to the original formulation of density dependence, the first-order density terms should have a positive effect and the second-order density terms should have a negative effect. Using this approach it is possible to ascertain which level of geographic density has the greatest impact on foundings. Specifically, it is possible to test the hypothesis that legitimation is driven by both national and regional density but that competition is driven primarily by regional density.
DATA AND METHODS
To address the question of whether regional density fits the founding model better than national density, we use data collected by the research team headed by G. Carroll and M. Hannan (see . The data base includes information on all firms which engaged in automobile production activity in the United States since the inception of the industry until 1981.
In constructing the data base, the team primarily relied on three sources: The New Encyclopedia of Motorcars (Georgano et al., 1982) , The World Guide to Automobile Manufacturers (Baldwin et al., 1987) , and the three volumes of The Standard Catalog of American Cars (Kimes and Clark, 1989; Flammang et al., 1989; Gunnell et al., 1987) . These sources provide comprehensive information on automobile producers including descriptions of the models produced, start and end dates of production, and historical accounts of organizational and production processes. Rules for defining the population were based, in part, on the guidelines set forth by the automotive historians who compiled these encyclopedias. To be included in the population of U.S. auto manufacturers, firms had to be engaged in the production of cars for sale; i.e., individuals who produced one-of-a-kind 7 It should be noted that this model differs from a conventional density-dependent model since N i is not total U.S. density, nor is the founding rate that of the entire population's, but rather only the focal region's. For purposes of comparison with previous analyses of founding rates, we ran a conventional model, i.e., a model in which the national founding rate is dependent on national density terms. We found that the signs of the coefficients reflect the predicted pattern. (For a confirmation of these results see machines for their own use were not included. Further, the study eliminated firms which exclusively produced trucks, commercial vehicles, and race cars.
The total number of producers included in the study is 2197, with a peak of 345 in 1910. While this may seem like a surprisingly large number of firms, it should be emphasized that this data set has been constructed using archival resources and data-base programs which were not available to earlier researchers (e.g., Epstein, 1928) . Also, our definition of a firm includes many of the short-lived individual producers who failed to qualify for inclusion in similar studies. 8 Because the sources list information by model, not firm, we recoded the data such that models were grouped together under the same firm, as needed. Also, we retrieved and coded information on specific types of organizational foundings and deaths so that complicated firm genealogies (which include mergers and acquisitions) could be accounted for and analyzed appropriately. Thus, once model data were recorded and specific starting and ending events were coded, the data base contained records on a firm basis, which could then be converted to annual spell data. Based on Hannan et al.'s (1995) study, the time period of the study presented here begins in 1885, shortly after the first world producer appears. Observation stops at the end of 1981, the last year for which there is complete, reliable information. Regional location information was coded using the state from each firm's address. 9 States were assigned to one of five geographical regions: New England, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, West and South. 10 If a firm moved from one region to another, we adjusted the density count accordingly. A relocation by itself, however, was not coded as either a founding or death.
We also collected data on relevant industry and socioeconomic covariates for which a complete time series could be found. These include: total U.S. car production, compiled from Ward's Automotive Yearbook, Automotive News, and World Motor Vehicle Data, U.S. resident population, CPI, and GNP from Statistical Abstract of the United States, and three time-period dummy variables based on the research of Altshuler et al. (1984) . These periods of development in the auto industry are the mass production period (Mass) which begins in 1902, the product differentiation period (Diff) which begins in 1950, and the Japanese technology period (JT) which begins in 1968.
Although the sourcebooks sometimes give exact dates for the beginnings of spells of production, at other times only the year in which a founding occurred is 8 See Carroll (1997) for an extended discussion of the theoretical motivation behind these differences. 9 Prior to WWI, multiplant firms were rare. For purposes of consistency, multiplant firms are assigned one location based on the firm's headquarters. 10 Regions are constructed as follows. available. This lack of precise dating means that, consistent with most previous studies of organizational founding, we analyze time-series data of annual event counts. We estimate models with covariates log linearly related to the rate, assuming a negative binomial model and using quasi-likelihood estimators 11 (see Barron, 1992) . We lag all covariates one year to ensure exogeneity. 12 Table 1 presents the estimates of models restricting density to the focal region (using the specification in Eq. (2.2)). As expected, the first-order regional density term (here the natural log of n i ) is positive and significant for all regions. In contrast, the second-order effects are much weaker. Only New England exhibits a negative and significant coefficient. The covariates, with the exception of the first two time periods, show few consistent or significant effects. However, the mass production period dummy is consistently negative and significant in the three largest regions (New England, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest). 13 The differentiation period dummy coefficients seem to have the opposite effect on foundings, given the largely positive effect, although the West is an exception. Table 2 shows model estimates when only the national density terms are included in the analysis (as specified in Eq. (2.3)). Again, the first-order density term is positive and significant across regions, as predicted. And again, the second-order density term fails to produce the expected negative effect, except in the Midwest region, which does have a small but significant and negative coefficient. Thus, there is evidence of a ''spillover'' legitimation effect from other regions, but there is no strong evidence of a competitive effect as manifested through a depressed founding rate. The mass production coefficients remain consistently negative and significant in three of the five regions and the differentiation coefficient remains largely positive. Table 3 presents the strongest evidence in support of the hypothesis that legitimation takes place at a broader level of geographic density while competition occurs at a more local level of analysis. (These models are run using the specification in Eq. (2.4).) Both national density (ln N i ) and regional density (n i ) show consistently positive effects, and these are statistically significant in 7 of the 10 estimates. Overall, the pattern of estimates suggests that national and regional legitimation work in concert. 11 We do not use estimation procedures that make assumptions for unobservable heterogeneity, as does Lomi (1995) , because these estimates typically lack robustness (see Trussell and Richards, 1985) . 12 The negative binomial is preferred to the Poisson when there is ''overdispersion''-meaning that the variance of the event count is larger than the mean. Note that the sigma reported in Tables 1-4 indicates the degree of correction for overdispersion. As sigma approaches zero, the degree of overdispersion declines.
FINDINGS
13 This is consistent with the notion that mass production is associated with an increase in firm size to assure throughput (Chandler, 1990) , which may be achieved at the population level by industry consolidation. Thus a decrease in the founding rate would be expected. (Although mergers, which are treated as births, would increase, this increase would be more than offset by the decline in foundings of new firms and new entrants.) Also striking in Table 3 , is the strong competitive effect of regional density, reflected in the negative second-order regional density coefficients (n i 2 ). While the national density (N i 2 ) terms all have a small but depressing effect on foundings, none of these is statistically significant. In contrast, the regionally based n i 2 terms exhibit strong and statistically significant negative effects on foundings. The exception to this pattern is, interestingly, the Midwest region which is where the greatest density evolves and which, of course, emerges as the geographic center of the auto industry. Table 4 provides corroboration of the impact of regional density on competition. Here, following the approach of , the higher level second-order density term is omitted from the analysis (as in Eq. (2.5)).
These estimates further support the hypothesis of legitimation operating on a broader geographic scale than competition. The first-order effect of national density remains positive and the second-order effects of regional density retain the same signs as in Table 3 . Attempts to replicate exactly the model by incorporating only a first-order higher level density term were unsuccessful. That is, when the models in Table 4 were run with only ln (N i ) and n i 2 , evidence of a strong competitive effect disappeared and model fit diminished. These findings suggest that regional levels of density played an important role in legitimating the organizational form.
Given the late stage resurgence of density in four of the five regions, we also ran models which control for industry age and age-density interaction effects. These models are derived from and Hannan (1997) who extend the conventional density model to allow density to have time-varying effects on legitimation and competition based on the age of the population. The extended models add variables for population age and the interactions of popula- tion age with density. These facilitate testing basic density dependence theory in contexts where legitimation and competition express diminishing strength over time.
Although estimates of these models provide some limited support for the proposed extensions, they do not consistently improve on those models reported in Table 4 . 14 Further, the lack of a consistent pattern across regions and across 14 We estimated a set of nested models designed to allow a hierarchical comparison. Beginning with a baseline model (the model reported in Table 4 ), we added variables incrementally. For each region we first estimated the baseline model (Model 4) then added the following variables one at a time: region-specific industry age (year minus start year of industry in region), region-specific models makes it impossible to draw sound conclusions from these results. Age-squared interactions with density are never significant and of the age interactions, only age-density proved significant in two of the five regions-the Mid-Atlantic and the Midwest. In these regions, the age-squared interaction with density has no effect while the age-density interaction is negative and significant, potentially indicating that density has a reduced effect over time. Further, in all of age-squared, interactions of region-specific industry age with regional density, interactions of region-specific industry age with regional density-squared, interactions of region-specific industry age-squared with regional density, and finally, interactions of region-specific industry age-squared with regional density-squared. We then compared the chi-squared values as well as the value and significance of coefficients across models within regions. Given the great number of coefficients estimated and the inconsistent findings (described in the text), we do not report the estimates in detail. the models with age-squared-density interactions and in most of the models with age-density-squared interactions, the main regional and national density effects disappear. We do find modest evidence that population age matters. Region-specific industry age has a strong, positive, and significant effect on entry in New England and the chi-squared value indicates an improvement in model fit. (Region-specific industry age-squared, however, has no effect.) Region-specific industry agesquared has a small, positive and significant effect in the South and Mid-Atlantic. (Region-specific industry age, however, has no effect.)
DISCUSSION
A wide variety of organizational scholars maintain interest in questions of entry, boundaries, and industry emergence. Such questions include, for example, to what extent new entrants respond to local conditions over national or international market conditions. A promising direction for investigating such questions within the organizational ecology framework involves examining effects of density at different geographical levels on population vital rates. Indeed, the theory of density-dependent organizational evolution has recently been extended in a geographically informed way that addresses questions of this kind .
The research presented here investigates and develops these issues. Following , our main purpose here was to test the hypothesis that density-dependent legitimation operates on a global scale, while densitydependent competition operates on a local level. The empirical findings support a general interpretation of this argument. For the United States, ''global'' turns out to mean national and local means regional; whereas in Europe the boundaries were found to be continental and national, respectively. The difference between these findings and those of suggests to us that geography and physical distance account for the different scale of effects of legitimation and competition rather than nation-state political boundaries. That is, nation-state boundaries do not seem to constrain competition and legitimation consistently in the two studies-physical space does. 15 We also find some limited evidence that these processes interact with industry age, such that the effects of density diminish with age. However, only two of five regions in the United States show evidence of this effect. We conclude that regional boundaries, which carry no real political standing in the United States, are less capable of capturing population-level inertial effects inherent in this specification, than nation-state boundaries, which attach to meaningful institutions (See .
The findings presented here also suggest an interaction between geography, physical space, and technology worthy of further study. The association of three distinct technologies with three regions in the early period of the automobile industry might be accidental or might arise from factors associated with these regions. These factors could include differences in terrain, weather conditions, extant transportation infrastructure, natural resource endowments (such as the availability of water for steam or gasoline for gas-powered engines), and local technical expertise.
Other researchers have noted similar positive effects of geographic proximity on technological development and the innovation process (Dosi, 1988; Jaffe et al., 1993; Feldman, 1994) . Carlson and Jacobsson (1991) argue that the boundary of new technology development is primarily regional. They suggest that during the early period of technology development, i.e., before standardization, close collaboration between firms is required. Geographic proximity reduces the hazards of technological uncertainty through collaboration and facilitates the transmission of tacit knowledge. Once standardization occurs, the benefits of geographic proximity are unclear. Agglomeration benefits may be subsumed by increased competition or proximity may continue to impart a net technological advantage.
Our results indicate that competition processes operate more strongly through regional than national density except in the case of the Midwest. This is an unexpected finding. One possible explanation for it may rest on the interaction effects of geographic proximity and technology on vital rates. It may be that in populations where different standards or competing technologies exist, the region which spawns the eventual dominant technology may be more sensitive to multilevel density, due to its function as a technological source for the entire population. Thus, competition effects are difficult to detect at the regional level for this region. However, regions which are initially associated with alternative technologies may remain more sensitive to locally driven competition due to their late adoption of the ultimate ''winning'' technology. Local capital, labor, supplier, and customer networks, whose limits are defined by physical space, would have to be reconfigured to conform with the new technology, impeding foundings. Could it be that slow adoption of a standard technology reduces agglomeration benefits and prolongs local competition? How does the composition of technological alternatives within a region effect these processes? Clearly more work is needed in this area (see Bigelow and Seidel (1995) for further discussion).
More abstractly, multilevel models of density dependence show similarity to recently developed models of path dependence in economic geography (Arthur, 1988 (Arthur, , 1989 David, 1988) . 16 Assumptions common to both types of models include (a) early conditions have enduring and pervasive effects, (b) initial growth displays positive-feedback effects, and (c) nearly chance events can have potentially far-reaching effects on population vital rates (Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Carroll and Harrison, 1994; Krugman, 1991; Arthur, 1990) . Where the two theories part company, not surprisingly, is on the issue of how to incorporate 16 Similarities between path dependence and density dependence have been noted elsewhere (e.g., Carroll and Harrison, 1994; Baron and Hannan, 1994) . sociological and economic forces in the respective models. Although densitydependent models downplay the role of firm characteristics, they do incorporate firm-specific and industry-specific control variables when possible. In contrast, economic models of path dependence offer little or no consideration of how sociological forces might determine population boundaries or how legitimacy effects population vital rates.
In density-dependent models, changes in density over time reflect the waxing and waning of the opposing processes of legitimation and competition. In the early stages of a population's evolution, according to the theory, the observed increase in density is a manifestation of the combined effects of strong legitimation processes and weak competitive processes. In the path-dependent economic location models, the initial increase in density in a given region is purely a function of weak or latent competition. The problem with ignoring legitimation, and the underlying social, political, and geographical factors associated with it, is that it makes it difficult to explain the advantages of density. Agglomeration benefits, knowledge spillovers, externalities, and the like are difficult, if not impossible, to use as justification for density benefits across populations. This is precisely the issue which a density-dependent model can account for once it is respecified at a lower or regional level of analysis.
